

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

The attached is for use at the Intelligence
Community retreat this Friday and Saturday.



Date 22 March 1979

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS
5-75 EDITIONS

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20 March 1979

TOPICS FOR COMMUNITY RETREAT (TALKING POINTS ATTACHED)

- I. ^{NITs}
~~1.~~ ^{Adjusting prod to NITs.}
~~2.~~ Report of production (clipped to inside back cover)
~~3.~~ Revision of the NITs (state of the exercise and consolidated proposals)
- II. Warning system (memo by Lehman)
- III. NIEs and IIMs (try to get Allan to put together something based on conversations with the NIOs about the extent to which DIA and INR have actually contributed to the NIEs and IIMs)
- IV. Quality of analysis (limited progress)

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NFAC #1436-79

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 54/79
21 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI Executive Secretary

FROM: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

SUBJECT: Notes for Mr. Carlucci on the Contribution the Three
Military Services Make to Intelligence Community
Objectives (U)

Attached per your request is a set of notes for Mr. Carlucci outlining the contribution the three military services make to Intelligence Community objectives. I have limited my comments to the contribution the services make in support of the NIO/SP program, which includes the production of National Intelligence Estimates and Interagency Intelligence Memoranda on foreign (mainly Soviet) strategic programs.

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Attachment

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SP - 54/79

SUBJECT: Notes for Mr. Carlucci on the Contribution the Three
Military Services Make to Intelligence Community
Objectives

Distribution:

- 1 - DCI Exec Sec
- 1 - D/NFAC
- 1 - NIO/SP
- 1 - NFAC Registry

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Attachment to
SP - 54/79

21 March 1979

Question: What contribution do the three military services make to Intelligence Community objectives as defined by the NIO/SP program of analysis and production on Soviet strategic programs?

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[REDACTED]

the three military services through DIA and through their own departmental intelligence organizations make a critical contribution to national intelligence production on foreign strategic programs. (C)

2. Representatives of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are active participants in the production of all National Intelligence Estimates and Interagency Intelligence Memoranda on Soviet strategic programs. The scope and significance of the contributions made by each of the services are largely dependent upon their respective areas of interest, manpower availability, and expertise. All of the service representatives bring to the estimative process professional military experience in research, development, planning, and operations--all of which is relevant to our assessments of Soviet strategic programs. (C)

3. The contributions made by the services include the sharing of information, such as the results of "in-house" or contract research and analysis. Contributions sometimes include analyses and views which differ from those of CIA on substantive analytical issues. (C)

4. The participation of the military representatives in the interagency analytical process provides analysts representing non-military agencies a better grasp of ongoing US programs and policies, which enhances our ability to understand and analyze Soviet programs and policies. From time to time their contribution includes sponsoring orientation trips for members of the Intelligence Community to US strategic facilities. (C)

5. The military services also participate in the three DCI Committees, which make valuable contributions to the analysis of Soviet strategic programs: Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC), and Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC). (C)

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6. As would be expected, each of the military services focuses its efforts on those areas of most interest to it.

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7. On balance, I believe the contributions the three services make to the production of national intelligence on Soviet strategic programs are substantial. The services do independent analysis in areas of direct concern to them, facilitate the flow of information between US military program managers and analysts of Soviet programs, provide analysts from non-military intelligence organizations with additional insights into US strategic programs and planning, and sometimes provide the national policymaker with exposure to divergent views as part of the national estimating process. (C)

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC No. 1441-79
20 March 1979

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SUBJECT : Community Weekend Retreat


1. I thought you ought to know that I have provided the following information to Frank Carlucci's staff, concerning the role of Treasury and Commerce vis a vis the Intelligence Community.

- ° Treasury and Commerce (and DoE as well) are NFIB members more as consumers than as producers of intelligence. They think of their primary role as aimed at extracting more relevant intelligence from the Community, rather than contributing to it.

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


- ° On the production side we have quite adequate relations between our own economic analysts and the policy support being provided within Treasury and Commerce. There is some unavoidable duplication, and some occasional lapses, but by and large our relationships are informal, extensive and probably as good as they can be.

2. On a broader plane, you might want to reread  think piece on The Two Faces of NFAC. The discussion at the farm may not rise to such philosophic heights, but you may have an opportunity to elevate it a little.

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
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The Two Faces of NFAC

1. Efforts to improve NFAC political-economic analysis are handicapped by our persistent ambivalence as to whether we are a classical intelligence or a foreign policy analysis unit. Although the classical intelligence function remains our most prominent undertaking, we have for more than a decade devoted increasing effort to foreign policy analysis. This shift mainly reflects the policymaker's realization that US national security interests go well beyond our military competition with the USSR. As a consequence, NFAC must now cope with two major and rather different tasks, with policymakers clamoring for increased support in both areas.

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
2. The analytical procedures involved in each area, however, are strikingly different.



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3. It is thus critical for a political-economic analyst to have good access to published material and knowledgeable persons in his field. His work is more akin to that of a good journalist or a policy-oriented academic, than it is to a classical intelligence officer. Furthermore, political-economic analysis is to a considerable extent a behaviorial science, i.e. an art form based on gut beliefs developed from experience. By contrast, classical intelligence consists largely of a painstaking piecing together of fragmentary clandestine information.


4. A major problem created by NFAC's clandestine origins is the relative isolation of its analysts from the open world.



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6. There are no easy answers to the problems created by NFAC's bifurcation. An ideal solution would be the creation of an independent government organization exclusively dedicated to the kind of policy analysis now performed mainly by OER and ORPA.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


National Intelligence Officers

21 March 1979

NOTE FOR: Dr. Bowie

Here are some background materials that may be useful in preparing for the retreat this weekend. They have to do with our efforts, in the context of the NITs, to coordinate our production with INR and DIA. Included are:

- a brief summary of our activities in 1978; ~~(IN YOUR TALKING POINTS)~~
- your talking points for the PRC(I) meetings in November and December that reviewed our progress;
- memorandums on our meetings with Tighe and Mark;
- the record of NIO coordination contacts and INR/DIA responses.



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7 November 1978

STATUS
INTERIM REPORT TO PRC(I)

2. Topics

I. Aligning Production with NITs

1. NITs allocated among NIOs *according to areas of responsibility*
2. Each NIO was asked to review the planned production of regional and functional offices within NFAC; and
3. NIOs and ^{NFAC} offices developed programs for analytic products relevant to each NIT within their area of responsibility.
4. The ^{NFAC Production} Board discussed each plan separately and critiqued and adjusted the program.
 - to ensure responsiveness and to promote an integrated, interdisciplinary approach to the analysis.
 - to identify the potential roles of other production components in the Community.
5. Thereafter the NIOs discussed the proposed NFAC production strategies with INR, DIA, and other agencies as appropriate, reviewed their production plans, and sought to promote a joint approach to fulfilling the NIT requirements.
6. The coordination effort is of course a continuing process.
 - with INR and DIA in particular, both at the executive level and at the working level.

- have ~~already~~ received tentative lists of analytic production planned by the other agencies, and
- together we are discussing these with a view to avoiding needless duplication and sharing the analytic responsibilities insofar as possible.

II. Evaluation and Updating (Plans + Schedule) NITS = 6-9 months.

1. Propose procedures for review on four-month cycle (December)
2. Hope ^{user} PRC members will begin the updating process ^(Aug 5/Aug 22)
internally (consumer input)
3. Recommend PRC(I) reconvene week of 4 December for purpose of:
 - hearing ^{producers} report on IC experience with NITS to date
(evaluation of topics and process)
 - initiate process of PRC review of NITS, updating them for the next period.

TALKING POINTS

PRC(I) Meeting, 14 December 1978

A. INTRODUCTION

The NITs review process has been managed by the interagency Steering Group in which the directors of INR and DIA meet with me to plan and oversee the various stages of the NITs process.

a. I have received their cooperation and support in presenting these proposals for updating the NITs.

b. This first review of the NITs, which were issued four months ago, has been something of an experiment, and I think it would be useful to share a few impressions with you.

B. EVALUATION

1. Our experience has demonstrated that the NITs can be a very useful tool--both for intelligence consumers and for intelligence managers. It has also shown, however, that we are not getting full value from this exercise.

2. The NITs have proved their usefulness in:

-- providing guidance from consumers to producers and collectors more directly and at a higher level than has ever been the case in the past;

-- focusing production programs on topics of priority concern to policymakers;

-- communicating to analysts and collectors the top leadership's interest in -- and need for -- the intelligence product.

3. The usefulness of this guidance as a determinant of production has been diluted, however, by:

- the nature of the questions themselves;
- the lack of standing they have at lower levels of the government; and
- the competition from requirements generated internally in the various policymaking departments.

° The questions grouped under each NIT tend to be broad and general; they are also directed to substantive areas ~~of almost universal interest~~ areas where intelligence efforts are already intensively applied. Thus ^{many} ~~the~~ NITs do not appear -- in the eyes of collectors and producers -- to add as much insight as would be desirable into the particular needs of policymakers.

If the NITs could be made a bit more specific we probably would get responses that are closer to the target.

° Policymakers at the assistant secretary level and below, and some middle level intelligence managers, apparently do not take the NITs as seriously as do

their bosses. Perhaps the user members of the PRC(I) can do more to communicate downward their personal interest in and support for the NITs exercise.

° A major reason that the NITs do not always get priority attention is that they must compete with the requirements for current production that department heads levy on their staffs from day to day. (They often address the same subjects however.)

C. REVISING THE NITS

1. Last month our Steering Group launched an effort to canvass as many of our principal consumers as possible to get their ideas on how the current questions should be updated and sharpened.

a. You'll recall that at the last PRC(I) meeting on 7 November, I mentioned that we would be updating the NITs and requested ^{each user} you, to propose whatever changes you thought appropriate by December 1st, if possible.

b. I met with the Directors of INR and DIA on ~~the~~ Nov 22nd to review our progress; they undertook to press their principal consumers for input and to forward to us the suggestions collected in their departments.

c. We also asked the NIOs to gather proposals from senior consumers through their interagency contacts, and particularly from the NSC Staff.

d. In these various ways, we received a number of useful suggestions from the NSC Staff, State, Defense, and Treasury.

e. The suggested changes I am tabling today reflect in almost every case proposals made by consumers at various policy levels.

f. For the most part they attempt to focus the questions on the most topical aspects of substantive situations, or to elaborate them in such a way as to elicit a more useful response.

g. Many of the NITs -- particularly those that address fundamental, perennial issues -- not not require any changes; thus we are proposing revisions only where they were requested or where they are clearly needed.

2. As for the Basic Long Term list, we suggest that these topics be reviewed on an annual basis.

D. PRC(I) APPROVAL

1. I present these consolidated proposals to you for your consideration today -- we want to be sure they reflect fully and accurately your needs.

a. If this version meets with your approval, we can proceed with publication of the second issue of the NITs.

b. If, however, you feel the need for more time to review these proposals or to suggest further changes, we can have another round of revision and coordination. We could then circulate a final draft for your concurrence without having another meeting.

E. PRODUCTION REPORT

1. I requested lists of production responsive to the NITs from INR and DIA.
2. These have been received and are under review.
3. We plan to report to you shortly on the results achieved so far in responding to each NIT.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #4823-78
31 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM :

[Redacted]

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SUBJECT : Common Themes in Community Responses to Coordination

1. There are several recurring themes in the responses NIOs have been getting from INR office chiefs:

- The NITs do not have standing. They have not been levied on analytic staffs as tasks requiring priority attention. The NITs, while known to be guidance from high-level policymakers, do not take precedence over existing requirements. Nor are they seen as driving production tasking.
- Analytic resources are fully occupied meeting the day-to-day needs of departmental consumers; there is little slack available to assign to longer term production, internally or externally generated. The Secretary's short-term questions are answered through the in-house current intelligence support mechanism.
- Cutbacks in personnel this year and next make it even less likely that resources will be available to work on non-departmental projects.
- The NITs cover the same substantive ground as questions being asked and answered during the normal course of business; they are not "new" questions and thus do not require new action. In most cases, production already scheduled--internal and Community--addresses these topics.
- The NITs are framed in such obvious, broad, or inclusive terms as to have little value in defining or directing the thrust of current analysis.

[Redacted]

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SUBJECT: Common Themes in Community Responses to Coordination

2. These reactions have not been heard as consistently from other production units in the Community, although many analysts share the somewhat uncertain or cynical attitude toward the NITs expressed in sharp relief above. DIA generally has been cooperative and receptive, while showing a natural disposition toward maintaining an independent, departmentally-oriented production program.



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25X1 GOAL : To Improve Community Warning Performance (New)

PRESENTOR: [REDACTED]

A. MANAGEMENT

1. Progress to Date

- DCID 1/5 has been approved by WNG and Community reps, now out for formal NFIB principals' approval. NIO/W will brief NFIB on it in April.
- The DCI has approved proposal for NIO Staff and SWS. ANIO/W recruited, now part-time, full-time 1 July.
- New charter for SWS in preparation to flesh out DCI decision. Hicks is negotiating for new SWS director. Latter will address staffing problem, but will need DCI/DDCI help.
- NIO/W has joined WISP Steering Group. WNG believes any further DCI involvement premature.
- NIO/W round of orientation visits to various commands
[REDACTED] 25X1
- HPSCI Evaluation Subcommittee (Rose) has deferred second NIO/W hearing indefinitely, but latter has testified to Oversight Subcommittee (Aspin).

2. Longer-Range Problems

- SWS must be restaffed and redirected to playing central role in warning research. 25X1

- In the next year or two WISF must be assessed for decision whether to go national.
- We must provide for a US national role in the NATO I&W system and encourage its development, especially by reducing barriers to dissemination of US-originated intelligence.

B. SUBSTANTIVE

1. Progress to Date

- Program to develop "warning consciousness" in the Community successful so far. NIOs have held five rounds of meetings and exercise is generally well received. In a few areas, may be approaching bottom of well. Have asked Review Panel to take a look.
- Second experimental DCI "trends" memo now in preparation. Believe this exercise can be very useful, but only if it is shielded from dead hand of coordination.
- Alert Memorandum now established as DCI warning vehicle.

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-
- Production strategy for NIT II.1 approved by WWG and furnished to NIO/SS. SWS will be production manager, when it is reconstituted. Until then, responsibility shared by NIO/W, DIA, and OSR.

-- Revised general indicator list, prepared by SWS, to be issued through NIO/W in April.

C. CRISIS MANAGEMENT

1. Progress to Date

-- DCI placed planning responsibility on NIO/W. Next step is to determine who does what on complex series of matters within DCI's own organization, go Community later.


-- Internal group (RM, CT, NFAC, and three Directorates) has met twice:

- Proposed crisis SOP forwarded to DDCI.
- Revising and updating checklist for informal use.
- Preparing inventory of concerns for transition to war - relocation, emergency arrangements, command arrangements, etc.

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-- WWG will be focus of Community aspects. Will be asked to approve crisis SOP after DCI/DDCI approval.

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Addendum

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[REDACTED] remarked that there is a general reluctance on the part of all NIOs to go inter-community on drafting if it can be done within the building. He said the review process is formidable. He added that there is a reluctance to use people outside the building as drafters, even when they are superior, because communications are bad. State, he said, is reluctant to provide drafters. (S)

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22 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert R. Bowie
Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM



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SUBJECT : Background Material for Weekend Retreat (U)

25X1 1. This package contains material you asked for, some material that [redacted] requested on your behalf, and some other information you may find useful in following some of the other discussions. (U)

2. The contents are:

25X1 Tab A: [redacted] memorandum concerning collection and production of intelligence.

Tab B: Notes reflecting the gist of my remarks to the SSCI Consultant Panel on Future Substantive Intelligence Problems and the Application of Technologies.

Tab C: A point paper [redacted] of how and why we are involved in many of these Community issues. 25X1

*Tab D: Explains the Publications Source Survey and some statistics it provides on Community contribution to NFAC production.

*Tab E: A narrative on Treasury and Commerce contribution to NFAC and the Community. (U)

* These papers were provided to DDCI per request from his staff. Presumably, he will draw upon some of the statistics for his discussion.

Attachments:
As stated

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This memo becomes UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from attachments

*NOW IN
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book*

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21 March 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bowie

SUBJECT : Topics for the "Community Retreat"

Bob-

1. There are two topics that I would bring to your attention for possible discussion at the "Community Retreat" this weekend: (a) the ambiguous relationship between priority production targets and priority collection targets at the national level, and (b) the multiplicity of mechanisms for evaluating the reporting from our missions abroad. While not -- by far -- your best source of information on either of these, I am painfully aware of the confusion that continues to prevail. (S)

2. Concerning the first, it is my understanding from the Executive Order that the President intended to set up -- at long last -- a system that would link production and collection in response to a common set of national priorities and requirements. We all know about the NITs, what they do and don't do, etc. However, the Executive Order does go on to say, "... the National Intelligence Tasking Center shall be the central mechanism by which the DCI ... translates national foreign intelligence requirements and priorities developed by the PRC into specific collection objectives and targets...." Does it really work that way -- are the NITs that guide analysis also setting collection priorities in any systematic way, and if so, how does the system work? My impression is that the two aspects of what should be a common and integrated effort are still proceeding their own merry ways, and if the paths cross, it is still too often an accident. For example, has the intelligence community made any real effort to ensure that it has adequate opportunity to comment on the quarterly Political Reporting Programs that has now expanded from an experimental requirements system into a widely applicable one? (S)

3. More puzzling perhaps, with all the current interest in the adequacy of our information sources, I wonder how widely it is understood how many mechanisms there are for evaluating reporting and how often they work at cross-purposes? To begin with, there is the FOCUS program which, in my view, can be made into an effective interagency evaluation procedure -- provided we work at it. But, there is also the Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC), the periodic reviews which State and the DDO do of their own reporting, plus various ad hoc assessments -- notably the current one under the [redacted] group. In my view, this proliferation of assessments involves an extraordinary waste of resources, the consumers of the collected product are often not fully represented, those that are

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unilaterally conducted notoriously are inclined to protect "their people", and we know for certain that missions receive praise that is scarcely warranted. I think the evaluation process is very much in need of being revamped -- and I would put my money into a beefed-up FOCUS approach. (S)



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
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Tab D

Background

The Publications Source Survey (PSS) suggests the contribution made to CIA finished intelligence production by various source systems. CIA analysts, when completing an article in the National Intelligence Daily, or an intelligence memorandum or report, or an article in several economic and S&T periodicals, rate the contribution of each relevant collection system to reaching the conclusions of the finished intelligence item. A "key" source is one that was of such importance that basic conclusions could not have been reached without information provided by that collection effort. Every finished intelligence item must have been based upon at least one key source; many rely on more than one key contribution. (S)

Detailed data from the PSS is available in the NFAC Requirements and Evaluation Staff.



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
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

16 March, 1979

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret)
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Stan:

We have reviewed the proposed changes to the National Intelligence Topics of Current Interest, and have enclosed a Department of Defense position on each change, along with several additional modifications which better reflect my requirements and those of the Chairman, JCS,

Sincerely,

Charles

Enclosure

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WHEN WITH ATTACHMENT

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